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1. Introduction. There is a common complaint among philosophers that scientists 
use the word “representation” too liberally. Representation is often contrasted with 
indication: representation is a distinction achieved by maps, linguistic performances, 
and thoughts, whereas indication is a less-demanding state achieved by thermostats, 
which indicate ambient temperature, and refrigerator lights, which indicate whether 
the door is open (Dretske 1981; Cummins and Poirier 2004). However, cognitive 
scientists often ascribe representations when it seems that mere indication is all that is 
called for. We commonly say that hidden layers in a neural network represent 
concepts, or that neurons in V1 represent visual edges, because they reliably respond 
diﬀerently to the circumstances they are said to represent (Ramsey 2007, 119–20; cf. 
Hubel and Wiesel 1962). But these “representations” are thin-blooded compared to 
paradigmatic conventional representations. For example, they cannot be invoked in 
the absence of an appropriate stimulus. So are cognitive scientists conceptually 
confused? Do they exaggerate their claims? And if the natural representations posited 
by cognitive scientists aren’t genuine representations, is the cognitive revolution dead? 
William Ramsey provides an excellent book-length exploration of these worries, 
articulating a qualiﬁed pessimism about their answers: 
…we have accounts that are characterized as “representational,” but where 
the structures and states called representations are actually doing 
something else. This has led to some important misconceptions about the 
status of representationalism, the nature of cognitive science and the 
direction in which it is headed. (2007, 3) 
Ramsey describes the “job description challenge”: to give an account of the distinctive 
properties of representations in virtue of which appealing to them serves a special 
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explanatory role. If the job description challenge can be met, then we can formulate a 
plan for conceptual reform. 
I undertake Ramsey’s challenge, but with a metadiscursive twist: I describe the 
Organism-Receptor account, which articulates conditions for ascribing 
representations, in virtue of which such ascriptions achieve a special explanatory 
purpose. The account is merely suggestive about the properties that distinguish ﬁrst-
order representational states from non-representational states; it says more about the 
mental state of the ascriber than about the representation-bearing system. However, 
the Organism-Receptor account provides a more adequate characterization of 
scientists’ practice than Ramsey’s. 
My main aim in this paper is to push back against pessimistic evaluations of the 
existing practice of representation-ascription in cognitive science, like Ramsey’s. I will 
focus on Ramsey’s critique of the “receptor notion,” a ﬂawed causal theory of 
representation that he attributes to some cognitive scientists. Ramsey argues that the 
receptor notion has absurd consequences, although scientists do not accept them. By 
augmenting the receptor notion with a construal-based background condition, I can 
explain why scientists do not draw these absurd conclusions. Whereas Ramsey’s 
pessimistic account of scientists’ practice of ascribing representations ﬁnds it wanting 
and is extensionally inadequate, mine rationalizes our extant conceptual practice 
(though that practice is not beyond criticism). I conclude that my apologetic account 
is a more charitable and adequate interpretation of existing scientiﬁc practice than 
Ramsey’s. 
2. Ramsey on the “Receptor Notion.” Ramsey argues that natural 
representations in cognitive science are often ascribed according to the “receptor 
notion,” a crude causal theory of representation. According to the receptor notion, a 
state s represents a state of aﬀairs p if s is regularly and reliably caused by p (2007, 119). 
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Ramsey claims that the receptor notion is what justiﬁes the ascription of 
representations to cells in V1 that detect visual edges, cells in frog cortex that detect 
ﬂies, and the mechanisms in Venus ﬂytraps that cause their “jaws” to close (119–23). 
Ramsey argues that this receptor notion is too liberal to be useful to scientists. For 
example, it is susceptible to the “disjunction problem” (Fodor 1987): since frog neurons 
respond reliably to visual stimulation by ﬂies or (say) BBs, we should say that the 
content of the representation is ﬂy-or-BB, rather than ﬂy. Likewise, Venus ﬂytraps 
represent objects in a particular range of sizes rather than edible insects, and the 
human concept GOAT represents goats-or-weird-looking-sheep. Such disjunctive 
content-ascriptions are usually considered absurd. Absent a clever ﬁx, we must 
embrace unwieldy, disjunctive contents for representations or we must reject the 
receptor notion (Ramsey, 129).  
Dretske’s (1988) teleofunctional theory of representation is a sophisticated twist 
on the receptor notion that avoids the disjunction problem. On Dretske’s view, a 
representational state must not only be causally dependent on the state of aﬀairs it 
represents, but must serve a function for its containing system in virtue of this causal 
dependency. This extra condition motivates constraints on representational content 
that eliminate problematic disjunctive contents. Dretske’s theory is subject to some 
subtle criticisms that I will discuss in Section 6, but the Organism-Receptor account 
will preserve some of the teleological character of Dretske’s theory. 
Ramsey’s most compelling objection to the receptor account, including Dretske’s 
sophisticated version, is that it justiﬁes ascribing representational contents to states 
that are not, in fact, representational: smoke “represents” ﬁre since the latter causes the 
former. Likewise, the ﬁring pin of a gun “represents” whether the trigger is depressed, 
and rusting iron “represents” the presence of water and oxygen (138–47). Ramsey 
claims, plausibly, that these are absurd consequences. I ﬁnd Ramsey’s reductio 
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compelling, but reject a diﬀerent premise than he does. Rather than conclude that 
cognitive scientists have a bad conceptual practice, I question whether his 
characterization of the receptor notion is a charitable understanding of what happens 
in cognitive science. After all, cognitive scientists do not generally claim that GOAT 
denotes goats-or-sheep (at least for competent judges of goathood), or that ﬁring pins 
represent anything. 
3. A Construal-based Notion of an Organism. I argue that something like the 
receptor notion can be salvaged if being a receptor is contextualized in terms of 
construal. Construal (also called “seeing-as”) is a judgment-like attitude whose 
semantic value can vary licitly independently of the state of aﬀairs it describes. For 
example, we can construe an ambiguous ﬁgure like the Necker cube as if it were 
viewed from above or below, or the duck-rabbit as if it were an image of a duck or of a 
rabbit (Roberts 1988; see also Wittgenstein 1953). We can construe an action like 
 
Ambiguous ﬁgures. Left: The Necker cube. Right: The duck-rabbit (image from 
Jastrow 1899). 
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skydiving as brave or foolhardy, depending on which features of skydiving we attend 
to. 
On a construal-based account of conceptual norms, a concept (e.g. 
REPRESENTATION) is ascribed relative to a construal of a situation. For example, 
perhaps I fear something only if I construe it as dangerous to me or detrimental to my 
ends (Roberts 1988). Daniel Dennett’s (1987) intentional stance is a more familiar 
example: according Dennett, a system has mental states if and only if we construe it in 
such a way that its behavior is explainable in terms of a belief-desire schema.  
I propose that construing something as an organism involves construing it such 
that it has goals and behavior, and believing that it has mechanisms that promote 
those goals by producing that behavior. More precisely: 
Organism-Construal. A subject a construes a system x as an organism in a 
context1 c if and only if, in c,  
(O1) a attributes a set of goals G to x, 
(O2) a attributes a set of behaviors B to x, 
(O3) a believes that the elements of B function to promote elements of G, 
(O4) a believes that x possesses a set of mechanisms M, and 
(O5) a believes that the elements of M collectively produce the elements of B. 
My main argument does not rely on all the details of Organism-Construal; it could be 
replaced by a diﬀerent explication of what it is to see something as an organism. But 
Organism-Construal captures an intuitive notion of a critter. First of all, we normally 
take living critters to have goals, such as survival and reproduction, and behaviors that 
                                                             
1 The relevant notion of a context is something like MacFarlane’s (2014) “context of 
assessment.” 
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promote those goals. However, Organism-Construal does not require that an 
organism really have goals (whatever that involves) or exhibit behavior (however that’s 
distinguished from other performances). To see something as an organism according 
to Organism-Construal, the construing subject need only attribute goals to the 
system, and see some of its performances as behaviors that promote those goals. Such 
goals could include relatively speciﬁc aims such as locating food, getting out of the 
rain, or driving home. We sometimes also attribute goals and behaviors to non-living 
things, such as automated machines. For example, we might say that a robot vacuum 
has the goal of cleaning the ﬂoor, which it accomplishes by sucking up dust. Or I 
might say that my GPS navigation computer is trying to kill me, which it accomplishes 
by consistently giving me directions that lead me through strange, dangerous 
backroads. Condition (O3) is expressed in terms of belief instead of attribution, 
meaning that the construing subject must sincerely believe that an organism’s putative 
behaviors function to promote its putative goals. When and insofar as someone 
construes a system in this way, the conditions (O1)–(O3) above are satisﬁed. 
Conditions (O4)–(O5) require that the system’s behavior be explainable by 
appeal to mechanisms. “Mechanisms” here should be understood in roughly the sense 
meant by the new mechanists (Machamer, Darden, and Craver 2000; Bechtel and 
Abrahamsen 2005; Craver 2007): organized structures of component parts and 
operations that produce a phenomenon, and the description of which is an 
explanatory aim of some scientiﬁc projects. Much explanation in biology and 
neuroscience plausibly follows a mechanistic model, and likewise in cognitive science. 
Daniel Weiskopf (2011) has argued that cognitive explanations are not properly 
mechanistic, but even on his view cognitive explanations are extremely similar to 
mechanistic ones, distinguishable only because the relationship between components 
of cognitive models and their physiological realizers is relatively opaque. Regardless, 
cognitive scientists use the word “mechanism” to refer to the referents of their models, 
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just as biologists and neuroscientists do. I am more moved by the similarities between 
the biological and the cognitive sciences than the diﬀerences. Therefore, like 
Catherine Stinson (2016), I acknowledge Weiskopf ’s concerns but nevertheless adopt 
the language of “mechanisms.” 
Not all of a system’s mechanisms function to produce behavior. For example, 
biological organisms have metabolic and other mechanisms that maintain bodily 
integrity. Such mechanisms may need to function correctly as a background condition 
for the organism to behave, but scientists do not typically take behavioral patterns to 
be the explanandum phenomena of such mechanisms. Let us call mechanisms that do 
contribute to the explanation of behavior behavioral mechanisms. As for what it 
means for a system to “possess” a mechanism, a mereological criterion will do for 
now: the mechanism must be a part of the system. Condition (O5) is meant to limit 
the mechanisms in the set M to behavioral mechanisms. 
So far so abstract; let’s consider an example. The robot Herbert was designed to 
wander autonomously through the MIT robotics lab, avoiding obstacles, and 
collecting soda cans with its arm (Brooks, Connell, and Ning 1988). Herbert can be 
construed as an organism, even though it is not alive, as long as one (O1) attributes 
goals, like avoiding collisions and collecting soda cans, to Herbert, (O2) sees some of 
Herbert’s performances as behaviors, (O3) believes that Herbert’s behaviors promote 
its goals, and (O4) believes that Herbert possesses mechanisms that (O5) explain its 
behavior. Herbert does possess mechanisms for accomplishing goals; it is equipped 
with sensors, computers, and motors that coordinate its locomotion and its grasping 
arm. And most people readily anthropomorphize Herbert enough to see it as a goal-
directed, behaving system (pace Adams and Garrison [2013], who insist that Herbert 
has its designers’ goals, but no goals of its own). Anyone willing to engage in the 
imaginative attribution of goals and behavior to Herbert can see Herbert as an 
organism, even if on reﬂection they believe Herbert is not literally an organism. The 
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willingness to ascribe representations to a system plausibly waxes and wanes along 
with one’s willingness to construe the system as an organism in something like the 
sense described above. There are psychological limits on the willingness to attribute 
goals and behaviors to systems relatively unlike animals, and these limits may vary 
between individuals. 
4. The Receptor Notion Re-construed. Returning now to the receptor notion of 
natural representation, I suggest that it can be augmented in the following way: 
Organism-Receptor. A state s represents a state of aﬀairs p if 
(R1) s is regularly and reliably caused by p, and 
(R2) s is a functional state of a behavioral mechanism possessed by an organism. 
Organism-Receptor is not a construal-based explication, but it depends on a 
construal-based account of ORGANISM. It preserves the spirit of Ramsey’s receptor 
notion, with the added condition that representations be ascribed to parts of systems 
construed as organisms. Representation-ascriptions guided by Organism-Receptor 
inherit their plausibility from the plausibility of the corresponding construal of some 
system as an organism. Most accounts of cognitive representation require there to be a 
representational subject of some kind (e.g. Adams and Aizawa 2001; Rupert 2009; 
Rowlands 2010), and on Organism-Receptor the organism serves this role. We can 
constrain the acceptable contents of these representations by requiring they 
correspond to descriptions of p according to which p is relevant to the pursuit of an 
organism’s goals. This appeal to goals is not ad hoc, since according to Organism-
Receptor representations are ascribed to organisms, i.e. systems to which we’ve already 
attributed a set of goals. Thus, like Dretske’s (1988) and Millikan’s (1984) 
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teleofunctional accounts, this construal-based account addresses the disjunction 
problem by appealing to goals of organisms. 
The metadiscursive job-description challenge is to provide criteria of ascription 
for representations, in virtue of which representation-ascriptions achieve some 
explanatory purpose. I have provided criteria of ascription, so what is their purpose? 
On Donald Davidson’s (1963, 5) account of intentional action, actions are performed 
under the guise of a privileged description (or set of descriptions). Davidson ﬂips the 
light switch in order to turn on the light, but not in order to alert the prowler outside 
(whose presence is unknown to Davidson) that he is home, though he also does the 
latter. Davidson calls this feature of action its “quasi-intensional character.” Behavioral 
mechanisms also have something like a quasi-intensional character, since there are 
privileged descriptions that make explicit how they and their components contribute 
to an organism’s capacity to pursue its goals. For example, edge-detecting cells in V1 
ﬁre in order to identify boundaries in an organism’s environment, not to consume 
glucose, though they also do the latter. The use of representation-talk by cognitive 
scientists, as licensed by Organism-Receptor, is a way to habitually mark these 
privileged descriptions and distinguish them from other descriptions of the same 
states or events. And since cognitive science is concerned with the functional 
structure of behavior-coordinating mechanisms rather than other features of 
cognitive systems, it is easy to see why representation—even in this relatively thin 
sense—has always been the dominant theoretical perspective in cognitive science. 
This focus on quasi-intensional characterization may even be what makes the 
cognitive scientiﬁc perspective distinctive (on scientiﬁc perspectives, see e.g. Giere 
2006). 
The Organism-Receptor account provides us with resources to salvage the 
receptor notion from Ramsey’s reductio. It is plausible to suppose that cognitive 
scientists generally ascribe natural representations to systems against an imaginative 
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background like this. After all, most cognitive science concerns the mechanisms of 
living systems, especially animals (except in computer science and some 
computational modeling, where the object of attention is a formal object like a 
connectionist network that is presumed to be analogous in some way to such a 
mechanism). Such systems are easily construed as organisms in the sense of 
Organism-Construal. Non-living things and even non-animals are in general more 
diﬃcult to construe as organisms in that sense, since they are often perceived to lack 
goals, the capacity to behave, or both. 
5. The Organism-Receptor Notion in Context. Consider a strong case of 
representation, like ﬂy-detecting cells in frog visual cortex. We construe frogs as 
systems that exhibit goal-directed behavior and believe they possess mechanisms that 
explain that behavior. Frog visual cortex contains mechanisms that (along with other 
mechanisms) explain behaviors like ﬂy-catching. When we identify cells in frog visual 
cortex that ﬁre in response to the visual presence of ﬂies (or ﬂy-like objects), we 
ascribe representational properties to those cells. The contents we ascribe to 
representations in frog visual cortex are constrained by the goals we attribute to frogs. 
That a small insect is present is a suitable content because ﬂies can be consumed for 
energy; that a wiggly BB is present does not have this signiﬁcance for frogs, although 
BBs may be indistinguishable from insects by the mechanisms in the frog’s visual 
cortex. Nevertheless, the relationship between ﬂy-presence and the frog’s goals 
provide a ground for privileging non-disjunctive descriptions of representational 
content. 
The Organism-Receptor account also explains why liminal cases of 
representation, like the case of Herbert, are liminal. We can say that Herbert 
represents such states of aﬀairs as the presence of obstacles and soda cans, because 
states of Herbert’s sensors are regularly and reliably caused by those states of aﬀairs. 
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And we can ascribe contents to representations by drawing on descriptions of 
Herbert’s environment that relate to the goals we ascribe to Herbert. However, our 
willingness to take these representations seriously as natural representations that bear 
content intrinsically covaries with our willingness to take Herbert seriously as an 
organism. We are not as comfortable attributing genuine goals and behaviors to 
Herbert as we are attributing goals and behaviors to frogs.2  
Finally, absurd cases like the ﬁring pin can be excluded (for the most part) since 
guns are not easily construed as “organisms.” Firearms are diﬃcult to 
anthropomorphize, since they do not exhibit autonomous behavioral dynamics and 
we don’t normally see them as having goals of their own. It is not impossible to ascribe 
goals to weapons or other tools, but the ascription of folk-psychological properties to 
tools, like the folk ascription of a bloodthirsty disposition to a sword, generally 
depends on the way a tool inﬂuences its users’ behavior. (I suspect this dependence 
might oﬀer some novel explanations of why Clark and Chalmers’ [1998] extended 
cognition hypothesis is attractive to some.) The attribution of autonomous behaviors 
to tools like swords is fanciful. Perhaps we might imagine a tool exhibits psychic 
“behavior,” but anyway we do not believe that swords possess mechanisms that 
produce this “behavior” (though if we did, such a construal would be more 
compelling). If the ﬁring pin of a gun is not a component of a behavioral mechanism, 
it cannot represent anything according to the Organism-Receptor account. 
So the Organism-Receptor account licenses an ascriptive practice that resembles 
the crude receptor notion when the role of construals is not made explicit. It is 
unusual in that it inverts Ramsey’s preferred order of ascription: Ramsey wishes to 
                                                             
2 Notably, Rodney Brooks himself does not claim that it is proper to ascribe 
representational capacities to Herbert (Brooks, Connell, and Ning 1988; Brooks 1991), 
but Brooks plausibly had in mind a more demanding account of representation. 
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ascribe cognitive structure to systems in virtue of their representational structure (see 
e.g. Ramsey, 222–235), whereas I suggest that we in fact ascribe representational 
structure in virtue of seeing a system as a system with goal-directed behavior, i.e. as a 
potentially cognitive system. 
6. Worries. Since the Organism-Receptor account shares a certain teleological 
character with Dretske’s account, I will discuss Ramsey’s two most developed 
objections to Dretske, along with other worries speciﬁc to the Organism-Receptor 
account. First, Ramsey objects that Dretske’s account is question-begging with regard 
to the job-description challenge. Roughly, teleological normativity (i.e. functioning 
and malfunctioning) is not suﬃcient to explain intentional normativity (i.e. 
representation and misrepresentation), and since Dretske provides no satisfying 
criteria for what it is for a state to function as a representation, he cannot bridge that 
gap (Ramsey 2007, 131–2). But the Organism-Receptor account has more resources 
than Dretske’s teleofunctionalism. Construing a system as an organism involves 
construing it as exhibiting behavior, which allows us to distinguish behavioral 
mechanisms from other mechanisms. On the Organism-Receptor account, 
misrepresentations are malfunctions of behavioral mechanisms (like frog vision), but 
not of other mechanisms (like a frog’s circulatory system or a gun’s ﬁring mechanism). 
My reply invites a rejoinder: on the Organism-Receptor account the functional 
roles of representations will be extremely diverse, and representations will be 
common. They will not just include IO-representation and S-representation (roughly, 
information-processing relata and models for surrogative reasoning; Ramsey 2007, 
68ﬀ.), which Ramsey and most cognitive scientists regard as genuinely 
representational. They will also include more controversial varieties of 
“representation,” such as Millikan’s (1995) “pushmi-pullyu” representations: Janus-
faced mechanistic components that simultaneously indicate a state of aﬀairs and cause 
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an adaptive or designed response. In other words, representations will include what 
Ramsey calls “causal relays” like the ﬁring pin in a gun, the inclusion of which in the 
extension of REPRESENTATION was the ground for his reductio! However, the 
absurd cases can be avoided. The ﬁring pin case is excluded because guns are poor 
examples of organisms. And pushmi-pullyu representations include cases with 
signiﬁcant intuitive appeal to many scientists, like the predator calls of vervet 
monkeys (Millikan 1995; cf. Seyfarth, Cheney, and Marler 1980). While this 
conception of representation has a more liberal extension than Ramsey is comfortable 
with, it is liberal enough to explain common representation-ascriptions in cognitive 
science without being so liberal as to countenance absurd cases like Ramsey’s ﬁring 
pin, so I submit it is adequate to scientiﬁc practice. 
Ramsey’s second objection is that Dretske is committed to a false principle: that 
if a component is incorporated into a mechanism because it carries information, then 
its function is to carry information (132–9). However, the Organism-Receptor account 
constrains the causal dependence criterion (R1) by relying on construals of systems as 
organisms instead of teleofunctional commitments. The account I describe is not 
committed to Dretske’s principle, and therefore is not subject to this objection.3 
Nevertheless, one might worry whether the organism criterion (R2) is a suitable 
condition on representation-ascription. I suggested ﬁve conditions (O1)–(O5) on what 
can be seen as an organism, but conditions (O1) and (O2) are fairly unconstrained. 
There are psychological limitations on when goals or behaviors can be plausibly 
attributed to a system, but what are those limits? And what factors inﬂuence 
interpersonal variability in willingness to make these attributions? The reason this 
practice isn’t bonkers is that it coheres with the explanatory purpose of 
                                                             
3 Ramsey’s discussion is rich and worthy of deeper engagement than this, but for 
reasons of space I leave the matter here. 
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representation-ascriptions: to make explicit the quasi-intentional character of 
behavioral mechanisms. Nevertheless, we should hope that these psychological 
limitations are vindicated by more principled considerations. Criticism is warranted if 
scientists attribute goals and behaviors when they should not. There is some extant 
work on the proper norms ascribing goals to organisms (e.g. Shea 2013; Piccinini 2015, 
chap. 6), but little serious work on how to understand the concept of BEHAVIOR in 
the context of cognitive science. We should worry about the practice of ascribing 
natural representations if scientists construe things that are not cognitive systems as 
“organisms.” Indeed, we might indeed worry that many cognitive scientists misuse the 
concept COGNITION, given the intense disagreements over its extension (see e.g. 
Akagi 2017). However, my present aim is not to evaluate scientiﬁc practice, but to 
describe it faithfully (with the hope that a more satisfactory evaluation will follow). 
Another worry about construal-based accounts is that they entail an 
unattractive anti-realism: if representations and their contents only exist relative to 
construals, they are mind-dependent rather than objective, right? This worry is 
unfounded. I am undertaking a modiﬁed version of Ramsey’s job description 
challenge: my aim is to describe the ascription of representations in virtue of which 
they serve an explanatory purpose, not to distinguish genuinely representational 
states from non-representational states. The Organism-Receptor account does not 
entail that representations exist relative to construals, only that they are ascribed 
relative to construals. My account is consistent with the existence of a ﬁrst-order 
account of the metaphysics of representation that justiﬁes this practice (or doesn’t). 
After all, the duck-rabbit can be construed as a duck even if it is not a duck, and 
nothing about that fact entails that ducks (or unambiguous images of ducks) are not 
real. The Organism-Receptor account describes a norm that plausibly guides human 
scientists with imperfect capacities for knowledge. But while my solution to the 
metadiscursive job description challenge is not inconsistent with Ramsey’s solution to 
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the ﬁrst-order job description challenge, it is inconsistent with Ramsey’s 
characterization of scientiﬁc norms for ascribing natural representations. 
7. Conclusion. I began by observing the common worry that scientists ascribe 
representations more liberally than many philosophers are comfortable with, and in 
particular that scientists rely on an unsatisfactory “receptor” criterion. I sketched an 
account on which scientists ascribe natural representations only to components of 
mechanisms of systems construed as “organisms.” Since in practice cognitive scientists 
attend almost exclusively to systems that are easily so construed, their behavior may 
appear to be guided by the crude receptor criterion whereas in fact it is guided by the 
Organism-Receptor criterion. However, while the Organism-Receptor account is still 
relatively liberal, a crucial diﬀerence between the two accounts is that the crude 
criterion has absurd consequences, whereas such consequences are eliminated or 
marginalized on the Organism-Receptor criterion. Since scientists do not in fact 
endorse these absurd consequences, I argue that the augmented criterion is a better 
hypothesis regarding norms for representation-ascription in cognitive science. 
This is proposal is not a comprehensive, new theory of representation, but it 
accomplishes two things. First, it provides argumentative resources for resisting the 
common worry that cognitive scientists use hopelessly liberal criteria for ascribing 
representations. Second, it oﬀers a novel picture of practices for representation-
ascription in the biological and behavioral sciences, one that is less pessimistic picture 
than Ramsey regarding conceptual rigor in cognitive science. The picture is not 
beyond criticism—in particular, it wants for a more detailed account of the grounds 
that warrant attributing behaviors and goals to systems. But since it is more faithful to 
our practice than Ramsey’s it is likely to yield more productive suggestions for how to 
guide that practice into the future. I suggest that we safeguard conceptual rigor in 
cognitive science not by cleaving more faithfully to the representationalism of the 
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cognitive revolution, but by embracing role of construal in scientiﬁc inquiry, making 
it explicit, and subjecting it to reasoned criticism. 
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